Abstract. -In this paper, we study the information propagation in an empirical blogging network by game-theoretical approach. The blogging network has small-world property and is scale-free. Individuals in the blogosphere coordinate their decisions according to their idiosyncratic preferences and the choices of their neighbors. We find that corresponding to different initial conditions and weights, the equilibrium frequency of discussions has a transition from high to low as a result of the common interest in the topics specified by payoff matrices. Furthermore, under recommendation, namely, individuals in blogging networks refer to additional bloggers' resources besides their nearest neighbors preferentially according to the popularity of the blogs, the whole blogging network ultrafastly evolves into consensus state (absorbing state). Our results reflect the dynamic pattern of information propagation in blogging networks.
Introduction. -Blog, which is short for "web log", has gained its ground by online community as a new mechanism for communication in recent years [1] . It is often a personal journal maintained on the Web, which is easily and frequently updated by the blogger. In the past few years, blogs are the fastest growing part of the World Wide Web (WWW). Advanced social technologies lead to change of the ways of people's thinking and communicating. In the virtual space of blogs, which is usually referred to as blogosphere, bloggers present their perception, life experience, ideas, etc, on their blogs, which is instantly accessible and open to readers around the world who can comment on the posts of other bloggers. This creates the eden of free minds and ideas to trigger sparks of inspiration. Interestingly, the dynamic hierarchy of links and recommendations generated by blogs creates powerful collaborative filtering effect to the tremendous information flow travelling through the blogosphere everyday. Therefore, the blogosphere provides an extraordinary online laboratory to analyze how trends, ideas and information travel through social communities. Further investigation into the blogosphere will help understand not only the dynamic pattern of information propagation in such ecosystem, but also the collective behavior taking place on such social networks.
(a) E-mail:longwang@pku.edu.cn Much previous research investigating the phenomenon of information propagation on networks has been done by adopting classic Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) model in epidemiology [2] [3] [4] [5] . Thinking about a rumor spreading on social networks: first, an ignorant (I) acquires the information from her/his neighbors and becomes a spreader (S). Finally, she/he loses interest about the information and no longer spreads it again, and becomes a stifler (R). Accordingly, SIR models information propagation in which the stiflers are never again susceptible to the information -just like conferring lifetime immunity. Yet, SIRS models the situation in which a stifler eventually becomes susceptible again. For instance, in blogosphere, the SIRS model can be interpreted as follows [6] : a blogger who has not yet written about a topic is exposed to the topic by reading the blog of a friend. She/he decides to write about the topic, becoming infected. The topic may then spread to readers of her/his blog. Later, she/he may revisit the topic from a different perspective and write about it again. Thus the life cycle of the topics is analogous to the diseases'.
In the realm of sociology, extensive study of the diffusion of innovation in social networks has been conducted by examining the power of world of mouth in innovations diffusion [6] [7] [8] . Generally speaking, there are two fundamental models describing the process by which nodes in networks adopt new ideas or innovations: threshold models and cascade models (see ref. [6] and references therein).
In this paper, we empirically investigate the dynamic pattern of information propagation in blogosphere from game-theoretical perspective. Individuals in the blogosphere coordinate their decisions according to their idiosyncratic preferences and the choices of their neighbors. Assume that individuals have two choices, A and B. The payoff of an individual choosing A or B is composed of two components: an individual and a social component. The individual part comes from one's preference irrespective of others' choices in the network while the social component of payoff results from the mutual (reciprocal) choices of individual neighbors. As a result of such a coordination game, one adapts her/his strategy by imitation at each time step, that is, follows the more successful strategy measured by the payoff. Analogous to replicator dynamics, after generations and generations, the system arrives at equilibrium state. The dynamic behaviour of such process of information propagation is affected significantly by the blogging network structure. Thus we study the dynamics of information propagation empirically on a blogging network which is collected by our WWW robot. The dynamic pattern of information propagation as a result of the common interest in the topics specified by different payoff matrices is also observed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II deals with the blogging network data and explains the model we adopt to study the information propagation in blogosphere, and Sec. III gives out the results and makes some explanations. Conclusions are made in Sec. IV.
The blogging network and the model. -Since the global blogosphere has more than 20 million blogs, we focused in our preliminary investigation on its subcommunity -the Chinese blogs hosted by Sina. We viewed this sub-blogosphere as a close world, i.e., the links outgoing of the Sina blog community were omitted. We obtained a directed and connected blogging network consisting of 7520 blogs' sites which was crawled down by our WWW robot. In fig. 1 and fig. 2 , we report the in-and out-degree distributions of the directed blogging network. It is found that both in-and out-degree distributions obey power-law forms where P (k in ) ∼ k −γin in with γ in = 2.13 ± 0.66, P (k out ) ∼ k −γout out with γ out = 2.28 ± 0.096. The average degree of our blogging network k in = k out = 8.42. We noticed that about 18.4% of the blogs have no outgoing links to other blogs, but the in-degree of each vertex in the blogging network is at least one since our blogging network was crawled along the directed links. The fraction of reciprocal edges (symmetric links) is about 31%. The degree-dependent clustering coefficient C(k) is averaged over the clustering coefficient of all degree k nodes. In fig. 3 , we can see that for the undirected blogging network, it is hard to declare a clear power law in our case. Nevertheless, the nonflat clustering coefficient distributions shown in the figure suggests that the dependency of C(k) on k is nontrivial, and thus exhibits some degree of hierarchy in the network. Besides, the average clustering coefficient of the undirected blogging network is 0.46. The average shortest path length l = 4.28. Consequently, our blogging network has smallworld property and is scale-free. A detailed study of the structure of the blogging network is presented in ref. [9] . Let us introduce the game-theoretical model by which we study the information propagation on the empirical blogging network. The social network can be represented by a directed graph G consisting of a vertex set V and an edge set E. Each vertex i represents a blogger i (her blogs represents herself) in the blogosphere. A directed edge e(i, j) from i to j indicates that j's actions influence i's actions. Denote Γ i as the neighbor set of vertices to which node i's outgoing edges connect. At each time step, each individual has two choices: A and B corresponding to "not to discuss the topic (No)" and "to write something on the topic (Yes)" respectively. Let x i represent individual i's state (A or B). For convenience, the states are denoted by the two-dimensional unit vectors,
The individual's choice depends upon the payoff resulting from one's idiosyncratic preference and social influence (trend). Therefore, the payoff of an individual choosing A or B is composed of two components: an individual and a social component. The individual part f i (x i ) of the payoff results from the intrinsic preference for A or B irrespective of others. The social component of the payoff is dependent on the externalities created by the choices of one's neighbors Γ i . The social payoff is supposed to take the form j∈Γi x T i M x j , where the sum is summed over all i's outgoing linked neighbors Γ i . The payoff matrix M for the two strategies A and B (the choices A and B can be interpreted as) is:
where a > c and d > b. This is a coordination game where individuals should choose an identical action, whatever it is, to receive high payoff. Hence matching the partner's choice is better off than not matching (a > c and d > b). For simplicity, and without loss of the feature of the coordination game, we set b = c = 0 and d = 1 − a with 0 < a < 1. Thus the rescaled payoff matrix is tuned by a single parameter a. The payoff P i of individual i is:
where the weight w ∈ (0, 1) indicates the balance between individual and social payoff. Here we use the strategy update rule similar to imitation. In any one time step, individual i adopts the choice A with probability proportional to the total payoff of her/him and her/his neighbors choosing A: 
where S A i = {k|k ∈ {i ∪ Γ i } and x k = A}. Otherwise, individual i adopts B with probability 1 − W xi←A . This update rule is in essential "following the crowd" in which the individuals are influenced by their neighbors and learn from local payoff information of their nearest neighbors. Within this imitation circumstance, the individual tends to keep up with the social trend based upon the payoff information gathered from local neighbors.
Results and discussions. -We consider the information propagation on the blogging network when some bloggers are initially selected at random as seeds for discussing some certain specified topic in their blogs. All the bloggers are assumed to be identical in their interests and preferences, thus the individual part of payoff function f i (x i ) is identical for all i. For simplicity, we set f (A) = 0.4 and f (B) = 0.5 in our simulations (the same magnitude as 0 < a < 1). In this situation, bloggers preferentially discuss the topic in their blogs, hence we can examine the world-of-mouth effect in blogosphere empirically. In addition, all individuals are influenced by their outgoing linked neighbors. Individual i's social payoff is summed over her/his all outgoing edges in which she/he compares her/his choice with her/his friends' and obtains payoff according to the payoff matrix of eq. (2). The synchronous updating rule is adapted here. At each time step, each blogger updates her/his decision whether to discuss or not according to eq. (4). All bloggers in the blogosphere are assumed to coordinate their choices to their friends (whose blogs the outgoing links are connected to), because conformity with friends in choices leads to the solid basis to communicate and enjoy the fun of the topics. Equilibrium frequencies of discussions were obtained by average over 100 generations after a transient time of 5000 generations. The evolution of the frequency of discussions as a function of a and w has been computed corresponding to different initial conditions. Furthermore, each data point results from averaging over 10 runs for the same parameters.
We present the results of equilibrium frequency of discussions as a function of the parameter space (a, w) corresponding to different initial conditions in fig. 4 . The density of discussions is indicated by the color bar. It is found that the initial fraction of discussers affects the equilibrium results quantitatively. In fig. 4 , for a), b), c) panels respectively, there is a clear transition from high to low for fixed w when a is increased from 0 to 1. As aforementioned, the payoff matrix element a indicates the common interest in the topic travelling in the blogosphere, that is, when a is near zero, bloggers in the blogosphere show high interest in the topic and would like to write something about the topic; while a is near one, it means that people lose interest in the topic, and reluctant to discuss. Besides, the weight w also plays a role in equilibrium results. When w approaches to zero, namely, individuals neglect the social influence and only depend upon individual preference to discuss or not. While w tends to one, individuals are completely influenced by their friends regardless of their own idiosyncratic preferences. Otherwise, for intermediate w, i.e., the choices are balanced between their individual preference and social influence, the "self-organized" bloggers perform in a collective way that without a center control most of the individuals in the blogosphere change conformably from frequently discussing the topic to losing interest in the topic as a increases from zero to one. Moreover, the critical value a c of a at which the frequency of discussions transits from high to low is affected by the initial fraction of discussers. It is observed that for interme- diate weight w, the critical values of a c are around 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 corresponding to the initial fractions of discussers 1%, 21%, and 51% respectively. Thus although the initial condition influences the equilibrium result, different initial conditions do not change the equilibrium results qualitatively. In other words, for fixed weight w and certain initial condition, the density of discussions has a clear transition from high to low when a increases from 0 to 1. We show the frequency of discussions f d vs a for w = 0.66 and 21% of initial discussions in fig. 5 . The frequency of discussions decreases from around 84% to 4% with increasing a. The transition happens around a c = 0.3. Interestingly, we find that there are about 18.4% bloggers have no outgoing links at all. Hence, their states keep invariant because their decisions are not affected by neighbors. Accordingly, the whole blogosphere can never evolve into absorbing states in which all individuals make the same choice A or B. The typical evolution of frequency of discussions with respect to time corresponding to different a with w = 0.66, initial condition 21% is shown in fig. 6 . With a = 0.11, the blogosphere quickly evolves into the truncated equilibrium state where the frequency of discussion often drops down and recovers to previous level after a while. Near the critical value of a c with a = 0.31, the frequency of discussions is decreased at first. Yet, it strives to achieve the high level very soon and is retained small fluctuations around the equilibrium state. When a is increased to 0.41, the frequency of discussions descends quickly, and then oscillates around the equilibrium state. With a = 0.81, the frequency of discussions fluctuates with some "spikes"-occasionally, it suddenly erupted from 4% to 8%. Therefore, these results shown in fig. 6 can to some extent reflect the dynamic pattern of information propagation in the real blogosphere. When most bloggers show great enthusiasm in the topic (when a is near zero), they extensively discuss the topic in their blogs. For example, the fraction of the bloggers talking about "Microsoft" in computer com- munity is sustained at high value, even though there are often small fluctuations around the equilibrium state. And yet, when all individuals have low interest in discussing the topic (when a is near one), they are reluctant to mention it in their blogs. For instance, the discussion of "influenza", is rare at non-influenza season, but bursts out in influenza season. Consequently, being consistent with the dynamic pattern of information propagation in real world, our results demonstrate that the frequency of discussions has a transition from high to low due to the common interest specified by the payoff matrix for different weights w and initial conditions. In order to investigate the role of recommendation to information propagation in blogosphere, we consider a modified model based upon the above one. In blogging community, the system often recommends some recent posts on its main page. Thus the recommended posts are the information resources which are noticeable for the bloggers to acquire. In addition, when bloggers surf in the blogosphere, the probability a blog being visited is proportional to its in-degree. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that besides the neighbors to which the blog outgoing links connect, each blogger refers to additional K blogs which are chosen with probability proportional to their in-degrees, i.e., the probability p ij that individual i chooses j's blog (j Γ i ) as information reference is,
Since each blogger independently chooses K blogs according to the probability proportional to in-degree, the chosen K blogs of each blogger might be different. All the individuals are influenced by both their neighbors and the additional K blogs. Let A i denote the K blogs individual i chooses. The payoff P i of individual i becomes, And the according update rule is,
where S A i = {k|k ∈ {i ∪ Γ i ∪ A i } and x k = A}. The corresponding results are shown in figs. 7, 8. Fig. 7 shows the evolution of frequency of discussions with K = 10, w = 0.51 and initial condition 21%. With a = 0.11, the whole blogosphere ultrafastly evolves into absorbing state where all bloggers discuss the topic in their blogs (see fig. 7(a) ). While for a = 0.81, all individuals choose not to mention the topic at all (see fig. 7(b) ). By contrast, without the recommendation, the whole blogosphere can never evolve into collective consensus (see figs. 4, 5, 6 for comparison). In fig. 8 , we can see that the frequency of discussions transits from one to zero as a increases from 0 to 1. As a result, under recommendation, the blogosphere quickly attains the consensus state in which all bloggers make the same choices A or B. Herein, the selected (recommended) blogs act as leaders influencing other bloggers. Dependent upon the local information Γ i and global information A i , individuals finally achieve conformity of their choices. Therefore, our result may shed light on understanding the collective behaviour in the blogosphere.
Conclusion remarks. -To sum up, we have investigated information propagation on an empirical social network, the blogging network, by game-theoretical approach. The blogging network is a good representative of real social networks which have small-world property and are scale-free. We found that for different weight w and initial conditions, the frequency of discussions has a transition from high to low resulting from the common interest specified by the payoff matrix. To some extent, our results reflect the dynamic pattern of information propagation in blogosphere. Moreover, under the circumstance of recommendation, the recommended blogs based on their indegrees act as leaders influencing other bloggers. Hence, the whole blogosphere evolves into absorbing states where all bloggers achieve the consensus of choices. Based upon local information Γ i and limited global information A i , individual i finally collectively synchronizes her choice with others. Therefore, our results may help understand the collective behaviours of bloggers in the blogosphere. * * *
